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Nontechnical summary 
This paper studies energy bias in technical change (TC). We develop a computable general 
equilibrium model that builds on endogenous growth models. More specifically, we incorporate 
Acemoglu’s (2002) theoretical modeling framework and specify TC in four ways. First, R&D 
firms decide whether or not to enter markets for knowledge capital (innovation). Firms can 
choose between markets for knowledge capital appropriate for production of energy-intensive 
goods or non-energy intensive goods - both characterized by monopolistic competition. Second, 
producers decide upon adoption of these two types of knowledge capital (diffusion). Third, there 
is feedback between these phases of TC. Learning-by-doing, learning-by-using, and network 
externalities, among others, underlie such feedback. Finally, knowledge stocks built up in the 
specific intermediate sectors spill over to the respective production sectors as well. Thus, the 
model explicitly captures links between energy, the rate and direction of TC, and the economy. 
We subsequently derive the equilibrium determinants of biased TC and illustrate the model with 
simulations, in which we reduce the number of allocated emission rights associated to energy use. 
We find that feedback in TC, substitution possibilities between final goods, and general 
equilibrium effects are key determinants of the equilibrium bias in TC. We confirm Acemoglu’s 
finding that TC is biased toward the relatively abundant good (non-energy intensive) if the final 
goods are gross substitutes and that TC is biased toward the relatively scarce good (energy 
intensive) if the final goods are gross complements. However, in our CGE setting we find that the 
usual substitution effect reinforces the market size effect causing an equilibrium bias in TC 
toward the non-energy intensive good even when both goods are gross complements. If, and only 
if, the substitution effect is absent is the price effect strong enough to outweigh the market-size 
effect. The equilibrium bias toward the non-energy intensive good is more pronounced if positive 
feedback occurs in TC. If both goods are very close substitutes, or if the positive feedback effect 
is strong, or both, the model can yield a corner solution in which only knowledge capital is 
developed and manufactured that is appropriate for production of the non-energy intensive good.  
All this is of public concern. The more substitution possibilities exist between the final goods, the 
less the environmental policy reduces welfare and the rate of TC. If the substitution elasticity is 
sufficiently large, or the positive feedback is strong enough, or both, environmental policy might 
even raise the rate of TC in the non-energy intensive sector relative to the reference. Regarding 
the positive feedback in TC, a case for policy intervention arises as social returns to R&D diverge 
from the private returns since such feedback is external to agents’ decision-making. If feedback 
effects differ between sectors these intervention should be directed towards specific sectors. 
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Abstract 
This paper studies energy bias in technical change. For this purpose, we develop a computable 
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1. Introduction 
The last two decades saw the emergence of theoretical growth models in which technical 
change (TC) was no longer specified exogenously, but endogenously. Well-known examples 
of such models are the product-variety model of Romer (1990) and the quality-ladder model 
of Aghion and Howitt (1992). Yet, for long attention was mainly focused on how to sustain 
positive growth and therefore on the rate of TC. Recently, the bias in TC is receiving further 
attention since Acemoglu (2002) presented a modeling framework in which the bias in TC is 
also specified endogenously. Biased TC is of public concern, as regulatory measures affect 
different technologies differently. Depending on the economic characteristics of technologies, 
regulatory measures can therefore lead to different societal impacts and welfare costs. Thus, 
induced TC is not as straightforward as it may appear. In addition, if technologies have 
different external effects, or if markets for technologies are imperfectly competitive, or both, a 
case for directed policy intervention arises.  
Beside these theoretical contributions, several recent modeling studies show the importance of 
an endogenous specification of the rate of TC for climate-change analysis. Studies by 
Nordhaus (1999), Goulder and Schneider (1999), Goulder and Mathai (2000), Buonanno et al. 
(2003), Popp (2003), Gerlagh and van der Zwaan (2003), Gerlagh and Lise (2003), and Sue 
Wing (2003) all analyze effects of endogenous TC on the design, timing, or attractiveness of 
climate-change policies. Nordhaus specifies R&D expenditures in his R&DICE model 
creating an aggregate knowledge-stock, which has a lowering effect on the emission-output 
ratio. He rudimentarily accounts for spillovers by assuming that the social and private returns 
on R&D diverge. Popp follows Nordhaus except that R&D occurs in an energy-R&D sector 
in his ENTICE model, where energy R&D is subject to decreasing returns to scale and is 
assumed to partly crowd out other expenditures. His aggregate stock of knowledge enters the 
energy-production function as a substitutable input. Buonanno et al. specify a world-wide 
stock of knowledge in their ETC-RICE model that enters countries’ production functions and 
has a negative effect on countries’ emission-output ratios. Sue Wing specifies an aggregate 
knowledge-stock entering sector’s production functions as a substitutable input. Goulder and 
Schneider incorporate sector-specific expenditures on R&D that form sector-specific stocks of 
knowledge capital, where these stocks spill over to representative firms in the specific sector 
and where the resources available for all R&D expenditures are in fixed supply. Goulder and 
Mathai specify an aggregate knowledge-stock having a negative effect on abatement costs. 
Moreover, they incorporate a learning curve in the abatement sector. Gerlagh and Lise specify 
in their DEMETER-2 model an aggregate energy R&D sector building a stock of knowledge 
that (i) enters production functions of two types of energy as a substitutable input, (ii) spills 
over to these energy production functions, and (iii) leads to learning-by-researching. In 
addition, experience gained in the production of these two types of energy builds a second 
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stock of knowledge that enters energy production functions as a substitutable input as well. 
Learning rates, however, are constant and the same for both energy technologies. Finally, they 
specify S-shaped diffusion curves for both energy technologies. Though these studies 
recognize the importance of biased TC for climate change analysis, however, they do not 
capture this issue explicitly, or not at all, in their models. Goulder and Schneider (1999), for 
example, capture biased TC when showing the importance of opportunity costs of induced 
technical change although it remains unclear what exactly the determinants of this bias are in 
their framework. Jakeman et al. (2004) does capture biased TC explicitly. Yet, this bias 
depends only on input prices while the aggregate rate of TC remains autonomous in their 
specification.  
Given the importance of biased TC and the apparent gap in applied modeling studies, we 
proceed by deriving the determinants of equilibrium bias in TC. Subsequently, we study how, 
and to what extent, environmental policy has an effect on the rate, but especially the bias of 
TC. For this purpose, we develop a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model that 
captures connections between energy use, the rate and direction of TC, and the economy.a We 
incorporate Acemoglu’s (2002) theoretical modeling framework and specify TC in four ways. 
First, R&D firms decide whether or not to enter markets for knowledge capital (innovation). 
Firms can choose between markets for knowledge capital appropriate for production of 
energy-intensive goods or non-energy intensive goods. Both markets are characterized by 
monopolistic competition. Second, producers decide upon adoption of these two types of 
knowledge capital (diffusion). Third, there is feedback between these phases of TC. Learning-
by-doing, learning-by-using, and network externalities, among others, underlie such feedback. 
Finally, knowledge stocks built up in the specific intermediate sectors spill over to the 
respective production sectors as well.  
The novel contribution of our study is two-fold. In an applied framework, we show the 
importance of (i) feedback in TC and (ii) general equilibrium effects for the equilibrium bias 
in TC, in addition to Acemoglu’s partial equilibrium effects. The rest of the paper is 
organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model in detail. In Section 3 we discuss results 
that we obtain with policy simulations. Section 4 concludes. 
 
2. Model description 
Several economic agents interact over time by demanding and supplying commodities on 
markets. These agents are producers of final goods in production sector i, an intermediate 
sector manufacturing knowledge capital i for the respective production sectors, and a 
representative consumer. Final good X has a relatively high energy content whereas good Y 
has a relatively low energy content. Each agent is assumed to behave rationally and to have 
                                                          
a
 Note that environmental quality does not affect the economy. 
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perfect foresight. The markets for both final goods and for production factors labor and 
physical capital are perfectly competitive whereas markets for both types of knowledge 
capital are characterized by monopolistic competition based on the Chamberlinian large-
group assumption – firms have a monopoly over their own variety of knowledge capital 
although there are many close substitutes available. Monopolistic competition and external 
effects support nonconvexities in the production possibility frontiers of the final goods, which 
are due to a nonrival knowledge input. Nonrival inputs also cause nonconvexities in the 
innovation possibility frontier that are supported by external effects only.  
Each agent solves its own optimization problem and when all markets clear simultaneously, 
the allocation- and price vectors constitute a competitive equilibrium. Economic growth is 
determined by the growth rates of the stocks of physical- and knowledge capital, and of the 
labor supply. Growth of labor supply is exogenous and constant over time. Growth rates of 
both capital stocks are endogenous and reflect investment decisions of the representative 
consumer. The economy achieves steady-state growth over time with the stocks of physical- 
and knowledge capital growing at the same rate as the labor supply. We present a detailed 
structure of the model in the Appendix, and will discuss the main model elements below. 
 
Representative consumer 
The representative consumer maximizes her intertemporal utility function subject to the 
lifetime budget constraint. The intertemporal utility function is a nested constant-elasticity-of-
substitution (CES) aggregate of the discounted sum of consumption of goods X and Y versus 
leisure time over the time horizon (see equations A.7 and A.8 in the appendix). Unlike in 
integrated assessment models, environmental quality does not enter the utility function, 
implying full separability between consumption and environmental policy. 
 
Producers of final goods 
Production of the final good is characterized by a production possibility frontier, which is a 
Cobb-Douglas function of physical capital (
,i tK ), labor ( ,i tL ), emission rights ( ,i tE ) 
associated with energy use, and a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregate of available varieties of knowledge 
capital (
,i tKC ), i.e. the “Romer” production function. We assume knowledge capital i to be 
‘appropriate’ for particular combinations of inputs only, i.e. the production function of final 
good i (cf. Basu and Weil, 1998). Hence, one type of knowledge capital cannot be used in the 
production of the other final good. Vintages of these varieties are differentiated but equally 
preferred. Value shares are determined by base-year demands. This is not the complete 
picture, however, because knowledge generated by intermediate sector i’s aggregate R&D 
activities spill over, enhancing production possibilities: 
 4 
1
, , , , , ,
= 
Q Q Q Q
ii i i i i i
i t i t i t i t i t i tQ NS K L E KCα β α β χγ χ − − −⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅   ( 1,.., )t T= , ( , )i X Y=  (1) 
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where CXθ  is the share of good X in total consumption and nestWσ  is the substitution elasticity 
between the final goods in instantaneous utility. An increase in the relative supply of a good 
lowers its relative price, satisfying the law of demand. The change in relative price is smaller 
the more substitutable the goods are. 
 
Manufacturers of knowledge capital 
Two intermediate sectors, XZ and YZ , manufacture the knowledge capital appropriate for 
production of goods X and Y. Knowledge capital is assumed to be excludable but nonrival: its 
owner can prevent others from using it by deciding not to sell or rent but use by one firm does 
not preclude use by another. Software is an example. To be able to manufacture knowledge 
capital, however, firms in the intermediate sectors require a blueprint. Blueprints are also 
assumed to be nonrival but, in contrast to knowledge capital, they are assumed to be only 
partially excludable. Owners can prevent others from using their blueprints by means of 
patent protection, but cannot completely prevent the knowledge or experience that is being 
gained in the R&D processes from spilling over to other researchers or producers. This partial 
excludability causes private- and social returns to R&D to diverge. 
There exist multiple institutional structures that support a decentralized equilibrium (Romer, 
1990). We like to think of firms manufacturing knowledge capital separate from firms 
manufacturing final goods. Alternatively, one can think of firms in each production sector 
manufacturing their type of knowledge capital themselves, i.e. in-house R&D. As long as 
knowledge capital is created according to identical innovation possibility frontiers, the 
institutional structure is irrelevant. Likewise, it is irrelevant whether the innovation and 
manufacturing of new varieties occurs within departments of one firm or in separate firms as 
long as these new varieties are manufactured according to identical possibility frontiers and as 
long as the manufacturing decision is separable from the patent-pricing decision. In either 
case, the firm that owns the patent extracts the same monopoly profit. We assume that the 
firm that develops and patents the invention of new varieties of knowledge capital also 
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manufactures these new varieties and that he is the sole manufacturer so that there is a one-to-
one correspondence between inventive firms and varieties of knowledge capital. We therefore 
characterize manufacturing of knowledge capital in each intermediate sector by a single 
innovation possibilities frontier that comprises a fixed- and a variable cost component. The 
fixed costs can be seen as a ‘set-up’ cost related to the research and development of a 
blueprint for a new variety of knowledge capital, i.e. innovation, that a firm must incur once 
in order to be able to produce this new variety of knowledge capital. The variable cost 
component relates to their manufacturing. Finally, we make the assumptions that 
manufacturing of knowledge capital is a deterministic process and that aggregate innovation 
possibility frontiers are continuous, which allows us to avoid problems due to integer 
variables and uncertainty.b 
Set-up costs related to R&D merely involve final goods, and only at the time of entry. Rivera-
Batiz and Romer (1991) refer to this specification as the lab-equipment specification for its 
emphasis on physical inputs. As they also point out, this does not mean that final goods are 
directly converted into blueprints but rather that the inputs necessary for production of final 
goods are used, in the same proportions, for research and development instead. Formally for 
sector i: 
, , ,
I
i t i t i t i tN Q C Iθ= − − ⋅  ( 1,.., )t T= , ( , )i X Y=   (3) 
where 
,i tC  denotes consumption of good i and 
I
iθ  is sector i’s share in total investment in 
physical capital ( tI ). Note that this specification implies that R&D uses energy and 
knowledge capital indirectly, rather than directly, as inputs. 
This is not the complete picture because feedback in TC affects these R&D costs.c One 
feedback loop is that all previous R&D activities have an effect on current R&D, which 
Rivera-Batiz and Romer refer to as the knowledge-based specification of R&D. Learning-by-
researching and knowledge spillovers underlie this feedback loop. Another feedback loop is 
that adoption of any variety of knowledge capital in the previous period has an effect on 
current R&D. Learning-by-doing, learning-by-using, and an increased market size underlie 
this feedback loop. These feedback loops operate within each intermediate sector only 
because we assume the two types of knowledge capital to be too different from each other to 
benefit form each other’s technical changes: 
( ), , 1 , 1 , ,i i Ii t i t i t i t i t i tN N KC Q C Iξ υ θ− −= ⋅ ⋅ − − ⋅  ( 1,.., )t T= , ( , )i X Y=   (4) 
where iξ  is the feedback effect from last period’s stock of blueprints in intermediate sector i 
(
, 1i tN − ), and where iυ  measures the feedback effect from last period’s aggregate 
manufacturing of knowledge capital i (
, 1i tKC − ). The condition that in equilibrium demand for 
                                                          
b
 Even though indivisibility of blueprints and knowledge capital and uncertainty related to R&D processes are facts 
of life, averaging out makes these facts matter less at aggregate levels (Romer, 1990). 
c
 For illustrative purposes, we limit ourselves to one-period-delayed feedback.  
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knowledge capital equals its supply in any given period allows us to express the latter 
feedback loop in terms of aggregate manufacturing of knowledge capital rather than in terms 
of its adoption.  
Equation 4 reveals several interesting, though not surprising, implications for the rate of 
innovation of blueprints. First, higher expenditures on R&D lead to a higher rate of 
innovation. Second, a higher rate of innovation or diffusion, or both, increases the 
productivity of resources devoted to R&D. Yet, a third implication is that this increase in 
productivity does not continue to grow in proportion to the rate of TC if the feedback effects 
are smaller than one. If this is indeed the case, it might eventually become more productive to 
devote these R&D resources elsewhere in the economy.  
Once a blueprint has been developed, it is added to its respective stock and is therefore 
available for more than one period (see equation A.26). Variable costs of manufacturing this 
new variety of knowledge capital i subsequently comprise costs of labor (
,i tL ) and physical 
capital (
,i tK ) in any period. Moreover, adoption of any variety of knowledge capital in the 
previous period has an effect on current adoption. Consumption externalities and learning-by-
using underlie this feedback loop: 
 
1
, , 1 , ,
Z Z
i i i
i t i t i t i tZ KC K L
φ α α−
−
= ⋅ ⋅   ( 1,.., )t T= , ( , )i X Y=  (5) 
where iφ  is the feedback effect from last period’s adoption of knowledge capital i. Figure 1 
summarizes the specification of TC in our model.  
 
Figure 1.  Specification of technical change 
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Assuming symmetric cost structures for firms in the intermediate sector ensures that all 
varieties of knowledge capital are initially supplied at identical levels and allows us to express 
aggregate output of each intermediate sector in period t as: 
( ) 1 1, , ,       Ni N
i
i t i t i tKC NS Z
ϕ σϕ
σ
ϕ −= ⋅ =   ( 1,.., )t T= , ( , )i X Y=  (6) 
where the elasticity of demand for an individual variety, ϕ , equals the compensated elasticity 
of substitution between varieties. This is the usual Chamberlinian large-group assumption in 
monopolistic competition that determines the height of the constant mark-up over marginal 
costs. The mark-up, in turn, drives a wedge between the marginal- and average costs of 
manufacturing knowledge capital and therefore causes the innovation possibilities frontier to 
be characterized by increasing returns to scale. The feedback loops add to these increasing 
returns. 
 
Firms in each intermediate sector operate so to maximize their profits over time subject to 
these innovation possibility frontiers. The increasing returns generate profits in the immediate 
short-run, which attract new firms. Given that manufacturing knowledge capital is assumed to 
be a deterministic process, firms can enter freely and have perfect foresight, a new firm will 
enter at time t if, and only if, the present-value of profits, iV , is non-negative. This implies 
that the present-value of future revenues must be equal to or greater than the set-up costs 
related to the research and development of a new variety of knowledge capital (suppressing 
the time subscripts to simplify notation from now on):  
1
1Nii
i i
Z
V V FC
ir
σ −
⋅⎡ ⎤
− ≡ ≥⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
?
 
 
( , )i X Y=  (7) 
where ir is the interest rate and FC are the set-up costs that we both assume to be constant 
and equal for both sectors. iV?  allows future profits to differ from current ones, which might 
occur, for example, when moving from one balanced growth path to another. Yet, free entry 
ensures zero profits in a present value sense in a balanced growth path so that the V? terms are 
zero. Moreover, we assume that the elasticity of substitution between varieties of knowledge 
capital is equal for both types. This allows us to write the relative profitability of developing 
knowledge capital appropriate for production of iQ  as  
Y Y
X X
V Z
V Z
=  
  (8) 
To gain further understanding, we substitute the dual form of (6) (see equation A.24) into the 
market clearance condition for 
,i tZ  (see equation A.25) and rearrange terms to get an 
expression for the relative demand of XZ , which we substitute in (8):  
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  (9) 
We identify four effects. The first term on the right-hand side is the factor-substitution effect: 
to the extent iKC is substituted for other factors in production, the profitability of developing 
knowledge capital appropriate for production of iQ increases. The sign of this factor-
substitution effect is ambiguous when the supply of any factor other than knowledge capital 
decreases. Given the mobility of labor and physical capital across sectors, the sign depends 
mainly on the knowledge- and energy intensity of production in both sectors, which are not 
known a priori. Second, feedback has a negative effect on the relative profitability of 
innovation, as shown by the fact that iV  is decreasing in iPZ . The sign of this term is 
ambiguous as it depends on the sign and magnitude of feedback in both intermediate sectors. 
Finally, we identify price- and market size effects (Acemoglu, 2002). iV  is increasing in the 
goods prices, iPQ , confirming that there is an incentive to develop technologies appropriate 
for the production of more expensive goods. iV  is also increasing in iQ , confirming that there 
simultaneously is an incentive to develop technologies for which there is a greater market. 
Remember from (2) that the law of demand implies that a change in relative market sizes 
induces a price effect as well, leaving net effects ambiguous for now.  
To investigate the relative strength of the price-and market size effects, we follow Acemoglu 
by substituting the relative price of both goods, (2), into (9): 
11
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  (10) 
This expression shows that the elasticity of substitution between both goods is a determinant 
of the direction of TC as it regulates the relative strength of the price-and market size effects. 
The less substitutable goods are, the more scarcity commands higher prices and the more 
powerful the price effect gets relative to the market-size effect. If both goods are gross 
complements ( 1nestWσ < ), we expect a decrease in the relative supply of a good to increase its 
relative price and profitability so that the price effect dominates. If both goods are gross 
substitutes ( 1nestWσ > ) we expect a decrease in the relative supply of a good to decrease its 
profitability so that the market-size effect dominates. If both goods have unitary substitution 
elasticity, we expect both effects to balance.  
In addition to showing the relative strength of the price- and market-size effect, expression (9) 
reveals a new term capturing consequences of the usual substitution effect for the relative 
profitability of innovation. Substitution of one good for the other in consumption increases 
demand for the substituting good and hence the profitability of developing technologies that 
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are appropriate for production of the substituting good, ceteris paribus, as shown by the fact 
that iV  is increasing in 
C
iθ .  
In sum, we identify the substitution elasticity between both goods as well as feedback in TC 
as two key determinants of the equilibrium bias in TC, although net effects are ambiguous. 
What the equilibrium bias amounts to is what we turn to in our simulation exercise. 
 
3. Simulations 
We illustrate the model with three simulations. First, we introduce environmental policy and 
assume both goods to be gross complements ( 1)nestWσ < , e.g. electricity versus electronic 
equipment. Second, we introduce environmental policy and assume both goods to be gross 
substitutes ( 1)nestWσ > , e.g. electricity generated with oil versus electricity generated with 
wind. Finally, we introduce environmental policy and assume both goods to be gross 
substitutes while there is feedback in TC. We assume positive feedback such that researchers 
stand on the shoulders of their predecessors. We exclude the possibility of e.g. negative 
spillovers or ‘organizational forgetting’ by restricting the positive feedback to take on positive 
values only. Emission rights are associated to energy use and environmental policy takes the 
form of 25 percent fewer emission rights being allocated relative to a reference case. We 
calibrate the model to a balanced growth path of two percent that serves as the reference case. 
In this reference case, markets for blueprints are monopolistically competitive. We consider a 
26-year time horizon, defined over the years 2005 through 2030. We use illustrative data and 
parameters as reported in Tables 1 and 2. 
 
Table 1. Social accounting matrix 
 
Zero profits Income balance  
XQ  XZ  XN  YQ  YZ  YN  I  W  M   
XPQ  300  -8    -105 -187   
YPQ     220  -8 -28 -184   
XPKC  -100 100 -12      12  
YPKC     -100 100 -12   12  
XPFC      -20 20     
YPFC   -20 20        
PW        133 431 -564  
PL  -30 -20  -90 -60   -60 260  
RK  -90 -60  -20 -20    190  
M
ar
ke
t c
le
ar
an
ce
 
PE  -80   -10     90  
Note: numbers are in value terms. 
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Table 2. Parameter values 
Value per Simulation Description Symbol 
 1 2 3 
Growth rate g   0.02 0.02 0.02 
Depreciation rates      
 Physical capital Kδ   0.05 0.05 0.05 
 Blueprints Niδ   0.2 0.2 0.2 
Degree of homogeneity in knowledge capital PKCir   1.25 1.25 1.25 
Substitution elasticities      
 
Between the composite good and leisure in 
instantaneous utility Wσ   0.5 0.5 0.5 
 Between goods X and Y in instantaneous utility nestWσ   0.75 2 2 
 
Between varieties in aggregate production of 
knowledge capital 
N
iσ   5 5 5 
Feedback effects      
 From diffusion to diffusion iφ   0 0 0.15 
 From diffusion to R&D iυ   0 0 0.15 
 From R&D to R&D iξ   0 0 0.15 
Knowledge spillovers to production  iγ   0.15 0.15 0.15 
Policies      
 Reduction in emission rights er   0.25 0.25 0.25 
Note: Simulation BM refers to the benchmark or reference case; simulation 1 to fewer emission rights while both 
goods are gross complements; simulation 2 to fewer emission rights while both goods are gross substitutes; 
simulation 3 to fewer emission rights while both goods are gross substitutes and while there is positive feedback in 
technical change. 
 
For each simulation, we compare model results to the reference case where variables are 
reported as percentage changes from their reference case values. We compare outcomes with 
respect to (i) welfare of the representative consumer as measured by Hicksian equivalent 
variation, (ii) the structure of the economy as measured by consumption levels of both goods, 
and (iii) the rate and direction of TC as indicated by the amount of knowledge capital adopted 
in each intermediate sector (diffusion) as well as the concomitant number of blueprints 
required (innovation). 
 
Simulation 1: fewer emission rights when both goods are gross complements 
We consider the effects of granting 25 percent fewer emission rights annually, relative to the 
reference case, while both goods are gross complements of each other. One can think of these 
goods as electricity and electronic equipment. There is a limited possibility to substitute more 
efficient electronic equipment for electricity while generation of electricity requires relatively 
more energy as input than manufacturing of electronics.  
Figure 2 shows that the reduction in allocated emission rights leaves the representative 
consumer worse off in terms of welfare. The limited possibility to substitute final goods 
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allows the representative consumer to a certain extent to adjust to the policy. Yet, the 
allocation of fewer emission rights shifts the supply curve of the energy-intensive good 
upward, ceteris paribus, giving rise to a negative income effect as well as a deadweight loss 
that outweigh the substitution effect.  
 
Figure 2. Equivalent variation in each simulation 
 
 
Figure 3 shows that the reduced welfare translates into lower consumption levels of each 
good, relative to the reference case. Further, consumption levels of good X fall more than 
those of good Y as the representative consumer substitutes a limited amount of good Y for 
good X.  
 
Figure 3. Effects of fewer emission rights on consumption while both goods are gross 
complements 
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Figure 4 shows the effects of the reduction in allocated emission rights on diffusion in each 
sector. The moment the policy is introduced, aggregate demand for knowledge capital 
increases slightly because of the factor-substitution effect. The stock of blueprints in the 
economy is still high relative to its new equilibrium level causing knowledge capital to be a 
relatively cheap input to production, ceteris paribus. However, aggregate demand for 
knowledge capital falls in concordance with welfare and aggregate consumption as soon as 
blueprints depreciate and the stock approaches its new equilibrium level.  
 
Figure 4. Effects of fewer emission rights on diffusion while both goods are gross 
complements 
 
 
With respect to the equilibrium bias in diffusion, this factor-substitution effect is stronger for 
the energy-intensive good X. Therefore, more knowledge capital is substituted for emission 
rights in the production of good X, leaving us with a corresponding bias in innovation. 
Further, allocating fewer emission rights indirectly changes the relative scarcity of both 
goods, leading to the price- and market-size effects discussed in Section 2. Limited 
substitution possibilities between both goods ensure that it now becomes more profitable to 
develop and manufacture knowledge capital appropriate for production of the relatively 
scarce good X causing the price effect to outweigh the market size effect, ceteris paribus. In a 
partial equilibrium setting, this would leave us with an equilibrium bias toward the relatively 
energy-intensive and therefore scarce good X. When thinking of these goods as electricity and 
electronics, the higher cost of energy use implies that especially the electricity producers are 
induced to invest in energy-saving technology. In our CGE setting, however, we find that the 
substitution effect reinforces the market size effect to the extent that it leaves us with an 
equilibrium bias in diffusion toward the non-energy intensive sector Y. The representative 
consumer, for example, shifts away from electricity toward more efficient electronics, which 
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leaves manufacturers of electronics with an incentive to adopt more knowledge capital to 
increase their productivity as to meet this increased demand for more efficient electronics.   
Figure 5 shows the concomitant change in innovation. Rates of research and development are 
immediately adjusted to the lower demands for knowledge capital. With respect to the 
equilibrium bias, innovation is immediately biased toward the non-energy intensive sector Y, 
as the factor-substitution effect is smaller for innovation than it is for diffusion. The 
difference lies in the initial excess supply of old blueprints that causes this effect to be 
relatively strong for diffusion. Thus, the price- and factor-substitution effects are not strong 
enough to outweigh the substitution- and market-size effects with respect to innovation. It can 
be shown that the price- and factor-substitution effects are strong enough to outweigh the 
market-size effect if, and only if, the substitution effect is absent, i.e. if both goods are strictly 
complementary. 
 
Figure 5. Effects of fewer emission rights on innovation while both goods are gross 
complements 
 
 
 
Simulation 2: fewer emission rights when both goods are gross substitutes 
We next consider the effects of the same policy but allow for more substitutability between 
both goods. One can think of electricity generated with oil versus electricity generated with 
wind. There are now more possibilities to substitute both goods, as electricity is more or less a 
homogeneous good, while generation with oil requires more fuel energy as input than 
generation with wind. For now, we assume that there is no feedback in TC. 
Figure 2 shows that welfare levels are higher relative to the previous simulation as the 
increased substitution possibility allows the representative consumer to better adjust to the 
policy. Relative to the reference case, however, the policy still lowers welfare as the 
deadweight loss and negative income effect outweigh the substitution effect. As a result, 
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aggregate consumption remains lower in each period, relative to the reference case, although 
the representative consumer now substitutes good Y for good X to the extent that the 
consumption level of good Y increases relative to the reference case (see Figure 6).  
 
Figure 6. Effects of fewer emission rights on consumption while both goods are gross 
substitutes, with and without positive feedback (F) 
 
 
As in the previous simulation, the rate of aggregate diffusion decreases from the moment the 
policy is introduced as shown in Figure 7.  
 
Figure 7. Effects of fewer emission rights on diffusion while both goods are gross 
substitutes, with and without positive feedback (F) 
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Unlike in the previous simulation, however, the rate of diffusion in the non-energy intensive 
sector Y now increases relative to the reference case. This increase comes at the expense of 
diffusion of knowledge capital appropriate for the energy-intensive sector X, whose rate of 
diffusion is now considerably lower than in the previous simulation. As electricity is 
generated with more wind instead of oil, for example, electricity producers using wind 
turbines demand more knowledge capital while those who use oil-fired power plants demand 
less. One reason behind this stronger equilibrium bias toward the non-energy intensive sector 
Y, relative to the previous simulation, is that the market-size effect outweighs the price effect 
when the goods are gross substitutes. Another reason is that the increased substitution 
possibilities strengthen the substitution effect – more of the relatively abundant good Y is 
substituted for the relatively scarce good X – that in turn translates into a relatively higher 
demand for knowledge capital ZY, ceteris paribus.  
Producers of electricity using wind turbines, for example, are especially induced to invest in 
knowledge capital as to meet the increased demand for electricity from wind. Figure 8 shows 
similar trends for concomitant innovation in both sectors.   
 
Figure 8. Effects of fewer emission rights on innovation while both goods are gross 
substitutes, with and without positive feedback (F) 
 
 
 
Simulation 3: fewer emission rights when there is positive feedback in technical change 
We now build on the previous simulation and allow for positive feedback. Thus, we still 
assume both goods to be gross substitutes of each other. Presence of positive feedback makes 
the economy more elastic in that a given policy leads to greater adjustments in the economy, 
as already pointed out by Goulder and Schneider (1999). Hence, it should come as no surprise 
that the results of the previous simulations are accentuated by the positive feedback (see 
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Figures 4 and 5) but that their effects are nonetheless ascribable to the main effect of 
allocating fewer emission rights. The equilibrium bias in diffusion is a good example. 
Presence of positive feedback reinforces this equilibrium bias because the more producers 
adopt knowledge capital ZY, relative to ZX, the less costly it becomes for other producers to 
adopt knowledge capital ZY, relative to ZX. For producers of electricity using wind turbines, 
for example, it becomes less costly to adopt knowledge capital as the value associated to its 
use increases.  
Welfare levels are higher, relative to the previous simulation without positive feedback, 
because of the external benefits associated with positive feedback (see Figure 2). Yet, welfare 
levels remain below the reference case. Besides the distortionary nature of the policy, a main 
reason is that too few resources are allocated to the intermediate sectors from a social point of 
view.  
 
Sensitivity Analysis 
To gain further understanding of the model, we perform ‘piecemeal’ sensitivity analyses. We 
use central parameter values in all simulations (see Table 2) except for the parameter subject 
to analysis. We furthermore examine the sensitivity of the model to the policy in place. We 
report effects on the relative profitability of knowledge capital in each sector, as defined in 
equations (8)-(10), and on intertemporal utility. Both variables are reported in present values. 
Table 3 presents the results. Allocating 50 percent fewer emission rights, instead of the 
regular 25 percent, causes greater welfare losses. It biases TC even more in the direction of 
the non-energy intensive good. The opposite holds if we halve the reduction in emission 
rights. Halving the substitution elasticity between varieties of knowledge capital translates 
into higher mark ups over marginal costs of manufacturing knowledge capital, which attracts 
more firms to the intermediate sectors. The additional blueprints that are henceforth 
developed can substitute for more emission rights in production and generate additional 
external benefits. The upshot is that welfare losses associated with the policy are slightly 
smaller and that TC gets biased even more toward the non-energy intensive sector. The 
opposite holds if we double the substitution elasticity between varieties. Doubling the 
depreciation rate on knowledge capital raises the opportunity costs of resources devoted to 
R&D and leads to greater welfare losses, all else equal. A higher depreciation rate also leads 
to a smaller stock of knowledge capital and therefore higher prices and lower profits (see 
equation (10)). At the same time, however, the additional R&D that is now being undertaken 
generates external benefits in the form of the positive feedback from innovation to innovation. 
Therefore, net decrease in welfare is small. This effect is slightly stronger for the non-energy 
intensive sector that benefits from the policy, as TC is already biased toward this sector. The 
opposite holds if we halve the depreciation rate. 
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Table 3. Piecemeal sensitivity analysis 
 
Simulation Relative profitability of TC: 
VY /VX 
 Utility: 
U 
 Simulation  Simulation 
 1 2 3  1 2 3 
Regular simulation 1.004 1.079 1.090  0.947 0.951 0.954 
Policies        
 ter  halved 1.002 1.036 1.041  0.975 0.977 0.978 
 ter  doubled 1.010 1.201 1.232  0.877 0.888 0.895 
Model parameters        
 
N
iσ  halved 1.005 1.101 1.196  0.949 0.955 0.972 
 
N
iσ  doubled 1.003 1.075 1.079  0.946 0.949 0.951 
 
N
iδ  halved 1.004 1.083 1.099  0.947 0.952 0.955 
 
N
iδ  doubled 1.004 1.077 1.085  0.947 0.950 0.952 
 iγ    halved   1.087    0.952 
 iγ    doubled   1.118    0.966 
 iφ    halved   1.086    0.953 
 iφ    doubled   1.118    0.959 
 iυ    halved   1.088    0.953 
 iυ    doubled   1.099    0.956 
 iξ    halved   1.087    0.953 
 
iξ    doubled   1.111    0.959 
Notes: All figures are present values and indices relative to the reference case. Simulation BM refers to the 
reference case; simulation 1 to fewer emission rights while both goods are gross complements; simulation 2 to 
fewer emission rights while both goods are gross substitutes; simulation 3 to fewer emission rights while both 
goods are gross substitutes and while there is positive feedback in technical change (TC). 
 
Finally, we examine the sensitivity of the model to the positive feedback in TC. Doubling any 
of these parameters leads to smaller welfare losses associated to the environmental policy as 
more external benefits are generated. Profits in the intermediate sectors also increase and TC 
gets even more biased toward the non-energy intensive sector that benefits from the policy. 
Again, the opposite holds if we halve any of these parameters.  
Given that we identified both the substitution elasticity between both goods and feedback in 
TC as key determinants of the equilibrium bias in TC, we are particularly interested in the 
sensitivity of the relative profitability of TC to a combination of these model parameters. This 
reveals what the overall equilibrium bias amounts to in our model. 
Figure 9 confirms that the equilibrium bias in TC shifts away from the energy-intensive sector 
as both goods become substitutable. It also confirms that the positive feedback intensify the 
shifts in the equilibrium bias. This intensifying effect is absent when both goods are gross 
complements (remember that we restricted the positive feedback to take on positive values 
only), but increases when both goods are more substitutable. If we increase both model 
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parameters simultaneously, the model can become unstable. It subsequently tends to a corner 
solution in which only knowledge capital will be developed and manufactured that is 
appropriate for the non-energy intensive sector Y.   
 
Figure 9. Overall equilibrium bias in innovation 
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5. Conclusions 
In this paper, we presented a CGE model that explicitly captures connections between energy, 
the rate and direction of TC, and the economy. We incorporated Acemoglu’s (2002) 
framework on biased TC and derived determinants of the equilibrium bias. We illustrated the 
model with three simulations, in which we reduce the number of allocated emission rights 
associated to energy use. 
We find that feedback in TC, substitution possibilities between final goods, and general 
equilibrium effects are key determinants of the equilibrium bias in TC. We confirm 
Acemoglu’s finding that TC is biased toward the relatively abundant good (non-energy 
intensive) if the final goods are gross substitutes and that TC is biased toward the relatively 
scarce good (energy intensive) if the final goods are gross complements. However, in our 
CGE setting we find that the usual substitution effect reinforces the market size effect causing 
an equilibrium bias in TC toward the non-energy intensive good even when both goods are 
gross complements. If, and only if, the substitution effect is absent is the price effect strong 
enough to outweigh the market-size effect. The equilibrium bias toward the non-energy 
intensive good is more pronounced if positive feedback occurs in TC. If both goods are very 
close substitutes, or if the positive feedback effect is strong, or both, the model can yield a 
corner solution in which only knowledge capital is developed and manufactured that is 
appropriate for production of the non-energy intensive good.  
All this is of public concern. The more substitution possibilities exist between the final goods, 
the less the environmental policy reduces welfare and the rate of TC. If the substitution 
 19 
elasticity is sufficiently large, or the positive feedback is strong enough, or both, 
environmental policy might even raise the rate of TC in the non-energy intensive sector 
relative to the reference case. Regarding the positive feedback in TC, a case for policy 
intervention arises as social returns to R&D diverge from the private returns to the extent that 
such feedback is external to agents’ decision-making processes. A case for directed policy 
intervention arises if feedback effects differ between sectors.  
There are several ways forward. One is to pay close attention to the model parameters. As the 
model results depend to a large extent on the substitution elasticity and the feedback effect, 
special care should be taken to obtain precise estimates of these parameter values before 
recommending precise regulatory measures. Another is to study the extent to which feedback 
in TC is specific to various technologies or industries. If, for example, such feedback were to 
be specific rather than generic, then a regulatory measure would have different impacts across 
industries. We might then find that the lower welfare costs of policy intervention promised by 
several studies on induced TC are altered altogether by the feedback. We believe that the 
model presented in this paper offers a useful framework to study such questions on policy 
intervention, the rate and direction of TC and the economy. 
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Appendix. Structure of the numerical model 
The appendix provides an algebraic summary of the model. It is formulated as a mixed-
complementarity problem (MCP) using the Mathematical Programming System for General 
Equilibrium Analysis (MPSGE) (Rutherford, 1999), which is a subsystem of the General 
Algebraic Modeling System (GAMS) (Ferris and Munson, 2000). In this approach, three 
classes of equilibrium conditions characterize an economic equilibrium: zero-profit conditions 
for constant-returns-to-scale production activities, market clearance conditions for each primary 
factor and produced good, and an income definition for the representative consumer. The 
fundamental unknowns of the system are activity levels, market prices, and the income level. 
The zero profit conditions exhibit complementary slackness with respect to associated activity 
levels, the market clearance conditions with respect to market prices, and the income definition 
equation with respect to the income of the representative consumer. The orthogonality symbol, 
⊥ , associates variables with complementary slackness conditions. Differentiating profit and 
expenditure functions with respect to input and output prices provides compensated demand 
and supply coefficients (Hotelling’s lemma), which appear subsequently in the market 
clearance conditions. An equilibrium allocation determines production levels, relative prices, 
and incomes. The price of intertemporal utility is chosen as the numeraire and all prices are 
reported in present values. 
The model is solved for a finite number of time periods. To avoid that the complete stocks of 
physical capital and blueprints will be consumed in the last period, transversality conditions 
are necessary. We follow Lau, Pahlke and Rutherford (2002) by constraining the growth rates 
of investments in the last period to the growth rate of a quantity-variable –in this case 
instantaneous utility. The advantage of these transversality conditions is that they impose 
balanced growth but neither specific stocks nor specific growth rates in the last period. This 
condition therefore suits models in which growth rates are endogenously specified. 
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Nomenclature 
 
Sets and indices 
i  ,X Y  Sectors and goods 
t  1,..,T  Time periods 
 
Activity variables 
,i tQ  Aggregate production of goods 
,i tZ  Production of an individual variety of knowledge capital  
,i tNS  Stock of blueprints / varieties of knowledge capital 
iTN  Terminal stock of blueprints / varieties of knowledge capital 
,i tN  Investments in blueprints (R&D) 
tK  Stock of physical capital 
TK  Terminal stock of physical capital 
tI  Investments in physical capital 
,i tC  Aggregate consumption 
tW  Instantaneous utility  
U  Intertemporal utility 
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Price variables (in present values) 
,i tPQ  Price of goods 
tPC  Composite price of goods 
,i tPKC  Unit cost of knowledge capital 
,i tPZ  Price of an individual variety of knowledge capital 
,i tPN  Price of a blueprint 
iPNT  Price of terminal stock of blueprints 
,i tPFC  Unit price of inputs to the R&D related set-up costs  
tPK  Price of physical capital 
PKT  Price of terminal stock of physical capital  
tRK  Rental rate for physical capital 
tPL  Wage rate 
tPE  Price of emission permits 
tPW  Price of instantaneous utility  
PU  Price of intertemporal utility 
 
Income- and endowment variables 
M  Total income of the representative agent 
,0iNS  Initial stock of blueprints / varieties of knowledge capital 
0K  Initial stock of physical capital 
tL  Endowment of labor 
tE  Endowment of emission rights 
 
Unit demand variables 
,
PKCQ
i tD  Unit demand for knowledge capital in the production of goods 
,
RKQ
i tD  Unit demand for physical capital in the production of goods 
,
LQ
i tD  Unit demand for labor in the production of goods 
,
EQ
i tD  Unit demand for emission rights in the production of goods 
,
RKZ
i tD  Unit demand for physical capital in the production of knowledge capital 
,
LZ
i tD  Unit demand for labor in the production of knowledge capital 
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,
W
i tD  Unit demand for goods in instantaneous utility 
LW
tD  Unit demand for leisure in instantaneous utility 
WU
tD  Unit demand for instantaneous utility in the intertemporal utility function 
 
Coefficients 
ter  Emission rights index 
ir  Interest rate 
iFC  Set-up costs related to R&D 
g  Growth rate 
,
K N
iδ δ  Depreciation rates 
PKC
ir  Degree of homogeneity in the aggregate production of knowledge capital 
U
ir  Degree of homogeneity in intertemporal utility 
, , ,
I C W W
i X C tθ θ θ θ  Share coefficients 
, , , ,
Q Z Q Z
i i i i iα α β β χ  Cost price coefficients 
iγ  Knowledge spillover coefficient 
iφ , iυ , iξ  Feedback effects  
, ,
N nest
i W Wσ σ σ  Substitution elasticities 
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